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A B S T R A C T
The race against ‘Digital Darwinism’ in public sector had caused failures of several high proﬁle large-scale
Digitally Enabled Service Transformation (DEST) projects. While technical and managerial issues are often
emphasised as the factors underpinning such failures, the vital role of key actors and the interplay between these
actors and structures is underplayed when examining the causes of DEST failure. To enable a richer
understanding of DEST, this paper proposes an analytical lens combining Institutional Theory (IT) and
Structuration Theory (ST) to explore the case of ‘Universal Credit’, a very large and ambitious DEST project
in the UK. Analysis reveals that the institutional actors and structures played signiﬁcant roles in the
transformation process. Albeit governing the actors’ actions, institutional structures are shaped through actions
that are inﬂuenced by knowledge, power and norms. Hence, recognising and addressing these subliminal factors
are critical to promote actions that can facilitate DEST success. The contributions of this case study are two-folds.
Theoretically, it provides a distinctive conceptual approach to study DEST; and practically, the lessons help in
signposting better managerial practices.
1. Introduction
Digital Darwinism is an era demanding organisations to compete for
an unforeseeable future, due to the fast pace of technological change
and social evolution. This evolution has changed people's behaviour
and expectations (Solis, 2016a, 2016b). In adapting to such changes,
many organisations, including in the public sector have opted for digital
transformation to fundamentally change the way they interact with
citizens. Besides automating routine transactional processes through
digital government, attempts have been made to transform complex
public services such as the National Health Services and Social Services
through digital technologies. With a proud history in digital innovation,
successive UK governments have ensured that the country continues to
lead in adopting and implementing DEST across its public sector. To
reﬂect a ﬁrm commitment towards DEST, the UK government formally
outlined its ﬁrst digital strategy in the mid-1990s with the advent of
electronic government, followed by more recent eﬀorts to redeﬁne the
digital government plans in 2012. Early eﬀorts of large scale DEST
include the National Program for Information Technology (NPfIT),
which was focused on digitising patient records and integrating services
across the UK National Health Service (NHS). The NPfIT was not only
the largest non-military digital transformation project of the 20th
century, but also one of the biggest DEST ﬁascos in the world after it
was oﬃcially dismantled in 2013 (ParliamentUK, 2013). In fact, NPfIT
is not the only DEST derailment case in the UK public sector. Statistics
have shown that many other projects of the same scale have failed to
realise their initial objectives, thus requiring further revisions or being
terminated. These include the Digital Media Initiative by British
Broadcasting Corporation (BBC), Common Agricultural Policy Delivery
Programme (CAPD), and Universal Credit Programme (UC).
Despite facing ever-changing technology and social evolution,
internal and external forces have also played a role in hindering the
public sector's ability to adapt (Sivarajah, Irani, &Weerakkody, 2015).
For instance, digital skills, management capability, resources availabil-
ity, overarching demand of the citizens and strategy mismatch often
impose constraints on public sector's eﬀorts in implementing change
(Waller &Weerakkody, 2016). In a classic case, DEST implementation
can be potentially obstructed by conﬂicting mission of the institutional
actors, as well as the existing organisational processes or supporting
systems, and accepted norms (Deloitte, 2015). Against this backdrop,
although DEST is a technical-dominated initiative, the implementation
of projects/programmes should be viewed as a subtle and intertwined
process that is inseparable from social concepts, i.e. actions and
reactions of the social actors, and the underpinning conventions.
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Although most studies make sensible recommendations, they leave
the main challenges of DEST largely unexplored (see Janowski, 2015;
Majchrzak, Markus &Wareham, 2016; Omar & Elhaddadeh, 2016;
Omar, El-Haddadeh, &Weerakkody, 2016; Omar &Osmani, 2015).
Therefore, there is a need to uncover useful insights to enable better
future practices and interventions in DEST implementation – beyond
the existing paradox. As posited earlier, DEST is a socially-constructed
process – the fact that was also supported by previous studies (Veenstra,
Janssen, & Tan, 2010; Veenstra, Melin, & Axelsson, 2014; Walsham,
2002). Hence to facilitate better understanding and rigorously frame
the DEST context, attempts should be made to explore the role of
institutional actors and structures towards DEST implementation. To
provide some insights and reﬂections to both practitioners and
researchers, this study utilises a combination of Institutional and
Structuration theories’ concepts to explore the case of Universal Credit
(UC) UK, arguably the largest social beneﬁt system reform project in the
world (Channel4, 2011) – as a contemporary case of DEST. The idea of
welfare reform was muted in 2002, but only came into realisation in
early 2011 after the publication of the Welfare Reform Bill, introducing
the Universal Credit programme as a vehicle to simplify the social
beneﬁts system in the UK. The central aim was to make ‘work pay’ and
assists millions of beneﬁciaries to become ‘welfare independent’, by
introducing a single, secure system that replaces seven existing systems
of beneﬁts payment and tax credits (Gov.UK, 2010). As such, UC is a
highly ambitious, large scale programme requiring substantially com-
plex transformation of work processes, practices and norms in both –
central and local government. Therefore, by examining the case of UC,
we expect to draw evidence of how the actors and structures roles
inﬂuenced the DEST institutionalisation process.
This research is signiﬁcant as UC is still an ongoing project, but
many had doubted its outcomes and target achievement, despite of a
few times adjusted timeline (see JRF, 2015; NAO, 2016). Additionally,
the case analysis conducted in this paper is timely as the ﬁndings will
oﬀer both conceptual and practical implications at a time where public
conﬁdence towards the government's competency in programme mana-
ging DEST is deteriorating due to the constant failure of many large-
scale projects.
2. Case analysis
This case study was performed against the background of the public
sector, aiming to elicit better understanding on the roles of institutional
actors and structures in the DEST institutionalisation process. Such
understanding is not just critical in enabling the framing of the DEST
implementation by both researchers and practitioners, but to extract
insights, forming lessons to be learned from a selected case of DEST (i.e.
Universal Credit, UC). As such, an interpretive paradigm was utilised as
the underpinning research philosophy. In revealing the ‘truth’ about the
real world through subjective experience of individuals, this paradigm
suggests the ‘meaning versus measurement’ approach to be used as the
data collection strategy (Collis & Hussey, 2013). Hence, focus group and
interviews were used in gathering the evidence for this study, besides
reviewing of the existing reports or government publications that are
related to the case. As the selected paradigm relies on a subjective
relationship between the researcher and the subject under study – i.e.
the researchers’ values are inherently embedded throughout the
research process, the truth was discovered through series of negotiation
dialogues between the researchers and the research participants.
Besides generating knowledge or ﬁndings as the exploration continues,
such practice also informs better and sophisticated understanding of the
social world, where subjective elements and meaning are shared. This
facilitates understanding towards the social phenomena within their
natural setting, and helps acknowledge how they are recursively related
in shaping their social setting (Oates, 2006).
As each case potentially lure the speciﬁc purpose of inquiry and the
approach of linking many cases to one potentially represent ‘replication
of logic’ (Yin, 1994), UC was selected as a single case study for this
research. It was believed that UC is a unique and prototypical case of
DEST, which would be revelatory to the understanding of the institu-
tionalisation (and structuration) phenomenon of transformation.
Hence, a descriptive method is used to highlight the structuration
process within the UC institutionalisation process.
The process of data mining started with the review on government
reports or publications linked to the case (e.g. government policies and
credential audit ﬁndings), as well as news portals and blogs’ such as
“Digital by Default News”, “Institute for Government”, “The Money
Advice Service”, and “Citizens Advice” – within a time bracket of
approximately six years (2010–present). The process then evolves with
three focus group sessions, involving 30 UC key stakeholders from
various levels and stakeholder organisations of both public and private
sectors i.e. policy makers, senior staﬀs, front-liners, local government
staﬀ, IT Team, Program Directors, and IT/Transformation Consultants.
Finally, a series of interviews were conducted with ten selected key
stakeholders (i.e. Policy makers, IT Consultants, Program Directors, IT
Teams, and Front-liners) to conduct deeper investigations and verify
critical issues. Besides providing rich information, the combination of
these strategies was important to ensure reasonable data triangulations,
which is pivotal to provide a rigour and unbiased ﬁndings.
3. Universal Credit: welfare that works
Universal Credit was launched to transform the beneﬁt system in the
UK, by making the ‘work pay’ for some of the poorest people in Britain.
It was also targeted to remove the complexities of the current beneﬁt
system which trapped the claimants from working, and simpliﬁed the
six payments into a single payment based on real-time earnings
information. Through UC, social beneﬁt support is withdrawn slowly
as people return to work or increase their working hours; the ambition
is to remove over 800,000 people out of poverty. Universal credit
payments are based on real-time earnings information, and thus
supposed to be responsive to the ﬂuid realities of people's lives.
3.1. “Easterhouse Epiphany” and ﬁxing the broken Britain
The idea of transforming the UK Welfare system is rooted back in
2002, from Ian Duncan Smith (IDS) – Conservative Party Leader at that
time, visiting the Easterhouse housing estate in Glasgow (Timmins,
2016). The visit was later mocked as “Easterhouse Epiphany”, when it
triggered IDS an idea of improving less-fortunate peoples’ lives, leading
to the establishment of the Centre for Social Justice – a think tank that
is responsible to enlightening social justice in British politics
(“www.centreforjustice.org,” 2017). In 2007, the Centre published the
“Breakthrough Britain” report concluding that the welfare system is
trapping the beneﬁt receivers from achieving their potential and getting
sensible pay, thus needing to be transformed. Backed by the economic
impact projections of unemployment and poverty, the essence of this
report was echoed through the Conservative Party's General Election
Manifesto in 2010 – “Fixing Broken Britain” (Conservative Party,
2010). Upon forming the coalition government in May 2010, IDS was
appointed as the Work and Pensions Secretary to spearhead the
implementation of the dynamic beﬁt reform project, UC.
3.2. Getting the white paper for UC endorsed
Although the idea of having UC to replace the existing beneﬁt
systems was faced with objections in parliament, the UC plan was
endorsed by the Cabinet Committee through an intervention by the
Prime Minister, and support from the Chancellor's chief economic
adviser, the Minister for Government Policy in the Cabinet Oﬃce, the
Chief Secretary to the Treasury and the Deputy Prime Minister.
Following the endorsement, a white paper entitled “Universal Credit:
Welfare That Works” was published in 2010, outlining the merger of six
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‘means-tested in-work and out-of-work beneﬁts’: Child Tax Credit;
Housing Beneﬁt, income-related Employment and Support Allowance;
income-related Jobseeker's Allowance; Income Support; Working Tax
Credit. As it would be extremely large in scale (i.e. aﬀecting over eight
million households), such transformation would be digitally enabled
and would be ready for new claimants’ usage by October 2013,
followed by transfer of the existing claimants by October 2017
(Department for Work & Pension, 2010). With real-time information,
it was claimed that the digitally enabled service transformation is rather
simple and easy to use, but generous in advantages such as preventing
fraud and error, facilitate the people who are in poverty to enhance
their living, increase pay and employment, as well as lowered the
administrative costs.
3.3. 2010–2013: transformation deformed
With the white paper endorsed, a senior responsible person who was
an experienced DWP operation expert – was appointed as the Director
General for DWP in December 2010, to lead and manage the UC
Programme. Nevertheless, in November 2011, a new Permanent
Secretary was appointed to resume the task of its retired predecessor,
which oversees the programme. Although he was from a diﬀerent
department, the new Public Secretary (PS) had served the DWP
previously for a signiﬁcant period; this enabled him to have signiﬁcant
insight into social beneﬁt matters. In 2012, the PS undertook the task to
restructure the department, resulting into job combinations that
witnessed the duplications of senior leaders’ positions, including the
Director General who also had to serve as the Chief Operating Oﬃcer;
ironically both were irresponsible to oversee the UC (Timmins, 2016).
Subsequently, the DWP leaders realised that UC was implemented
without the operational blueprint–as neither the proposal nor the white
paper could be used to guide their actions, while the unavailability of
primary and secondary legislations (i.e. the legislations only completed
in 2013 – see Department for Work & Pension, 2015) had hindered the
blueprint preparation process. Without the actual guideline, the UC
contractor who was facing a stringent deadline had continued to work
on the system. Nevertheless, their attempt to build the system based on
the hybrid of agile and waterfall approaches had led to problems.
Meanwhile, the complex, new ‘claimant commitment’ module, was
worked on by a separate team that was less in-touched with the policy
people in the central agency.
3.4. 2014–present: getting back on track
The UC's problems were signalled by an act of narrowing the scope
and site for the pathﬁnder pilots that were planned. Furthermore, the
MPA's report had marked UC deliverables sections with ‘amber/red’
indicating successful delivery of the project is in doubt, with major risks
or issues apparent in several key areas, that required urgent address,
and whether resolution is feasible (Major Projects Authority Annual
Report, 2014). The publication of NAO's report in September 2013 then
conﬁrmed the grapevine, where ‘fortress mentality’, ‘green reporting’,
poor governance, and poor ﬁnancial control were named among the
factors impeding UC's progress, besides the major barrier of not having
the detailed blueprint of UC's operation, which was the source of
confusion between the suppliers’ systems. It was believed that all of
such impediments would gradually reduce the expected beneﬁts of the
DEST programme.
The PAC attempt to scrutinise the UC implementation was hindered
by the incomplete information supplied by the DWP. Meanwhile, the
Work Secretary then blamed the DWP staﬀ, including the PS for the
derailments, which then deteriorated their relationship, and led to the
termination of PS. The pathﬁnder's success in utilising real-time
information was then shadowed with the inability of the system to
detect fraud. The report then concluded that UC had experienced a
serious derailment, making the initial target to move all the claimants
into the new system in 2017 a distant dream. Later, the National Audit
Oﬃce (2014)) reported that the UC had faced a major reset – where the
delivery timeline is being pushed two years forward into 2017 for the
legacy claimants and early 2018 for the rest, where end of 2019 was a
new total completion target. The new Public Secretary then introduced
the UC programme board as the Responsible Owner, which helped to
overcome the green-shifting culture and investigate the implementation
plan.
4. Why was Universal Credit failing? Case synthesis and emerging
lessons
The rollout of Universal Credit that represents “the biggest welfare
reform in history” was impeded by several delays due to technical and
managerial problems, before ﬁnally gathering its pace. Nevertheless,
the potential shortcomings such as system security and delays in
payments has caused alarm – demanding close attention of all
stakeholders, especially the DWP, Treasury, Prime Minister and
Cabinet Oﬃce. The digitally enabled components of the UC system
further complicated the transformation process, as it involves change
well beyond the work processes into core functions and structure, the
most signiﬁcant being behavioural change needed from actors. To
understand the institutionalisation of such transformation, we delve
deeper into the UC case by utilising a Structuration and Institutional
Theory lens.
4.1. Synthesis: institutionalisation of UC
Barley and Tolbert (1997, p. 94) deﬁne institution as ‘socially
constructed template for action, generated and maintained through
ongoing interactions’, or template for ‘organising principles’ (Rao,
Monin, & Durand, 2003, p. 795). Giddens (1984) explained that institu-
tions are deeply-seated in accepted norms, established meanings and
externalised power. He also added that the social system is formed
thorough inseparability of the actors’ actions and structures, where
institution is part of it. Often, institution is externalised in common
structures such as politics, public opinion and customs/norms
(Barley & Tolbert, 1997).
Scholars argue that Structuration theory concept could facilitate
understanding of the social reproduction/modiﬁcation process, which
is the core of institutionalisation (Baptista, Newell, & Currie, 2010;
Scott &Meyer, 1994). The concept allows analysis on the outcome of
growth of events that develop over a period of time. The central concept
of structuration theory – “duality of structure”, views action as a
product of structure, and structure is maintained, modiﬁed or even
eliminated through action. In UC, as the structure was changed in DWP
and other associated public institutions linked to the project, the
institution became unstable because it has lost its original meaning
and legitimacy – a state known as ‘deinstitutionalisation’. Since the
situation was actions-led, great attention should be given on how the
actors draw on social structure in their action, as well as how the action
produce and reproduce social structure (Barley & Tolbert, 1997;
Whittington, 2010). In this study, deinstitutionalisation refers to the
destabilisation of the beneﬁts system, due to the replacement of the old
system with a new digitally-enabled structure i.e. UC. Although theorist
argue that erosion or discontinuity of the old structure is necessary to
trigger change, navigating its re-institutionalisation process is an
extreme challenge.
The actors’ role was examined by analysing the impact of their
actions towards institutional structure. As both actions and structures
are recursively related (i.e. structures being shaped by actions, albeit
guiding action) – the role of structure is framed through the impact that
it has on actions. While acknowledging the central concept of ST
principle i.e. even individual action are determined by the institutional
orders or social structures (Barley & Tolbert, 1997; Giddens, 1979,
1984), the interplay between actors and structures were mapped
A. Omar et al. International Journal of Information Management 37 (2017) 350–356
352
against the ST model, representing social orders of signiﬁcation
(generation of meanings through ‘organised interpretive); domination
(production of power due to capacity to control resources); and
legitimation (creation of expected obligations which shaping norms)
and actions of communication, allocation of resources, and sanction. As
the institution is potentially strained by the internal and external
inﬂuences, the reasons for the DEST impediment can be many. Never-
theless, as what was echoed in the ST – the prediction of social change
can be made based on actors’ actions, which was the main focus in this
study. As such, it is posited that the challenge to institutionalise UC lies
amongst the very leaders that spearhead the transformation process – at
all levels, particularly the policy makers. Without attentive focus, they
will fail to sense and acknowledge that their mission (or the institu-
tional missions), and the processes and systems of structures that they
support are already working against them, complicating the transfor-
mation process. Hence, it is important for the leaders to stay vigilant
about these aspects, and be ready to revise or reinforced the structures
whenever necessary.
Institutionalist postulates that institution is exogenous to organisa-
tion (Scott, 2004), turning the focus of institutionalisation process on
addressing how pressures cause institutions to emerge. In UC context,
the pressure was equally originated from both internal and external
institutional environments due to rapidly evolving technology, econom-
ic and social demands – or what is termed as “Digital Darwinism”. In
line with our earlier belief that an individual actor, especially the leader
has a signiﬁcant role in this process, the “Easterhouse Epiphany”
incident is an important evidence supporting such belief, where IDS
was the individual who was responsible in introducing such idea,
starting with the establishment of a new “legitimation” structure called
Centre for Social Justice. This new structure later had “signiﬁed” the
idea of reforming the welfare system through its publications. As such
idea had penetrated the institution (i.e. a push to reform the welfare
system post 2010 General Election), the DWP was forced to undergo
changes by transforming the existing welfare structure into the UC
system.
The main actors in this context are many, such as the DWP, the
political Parties, the Treasury, the beneﬁts claimants and local govern-
ments. Although the logic behind the UC implementation is to increase
the public value by eliminating the ‘beneﬁts trap’, the lack of commu-
nication had tainted the programme with massive misconceptions,
hindering positive actions to facilitate the UC institutionalisation. As
found in the case, UC had received negative messages and actions from
government agencies such as the National Audit Oﬃce, Public Account
Committee, Treasury, Cabinet Oﬃce and Major Project Authority, as
well as the claimants.
4.1.1. Signiﬁcation: theorising solution based on externalised ideas
Signiﬁcation process is the backbone of every structuration process.
The process helps to externalise the idea that the signiﬁer has and
subsequently generates meaning, determining interpretation and un-
derstanding towards a certain subject (Giddens, 1984; Nick
Olson & Khalid Yahia, 2006; Thompson, 2012). Subsequently, these
will guide the actors in ‘theorising’ the appropriate actions, which later
determine the shape of the structures that were acted upon. Actors’
values and believes have major inﬂuence over their interpretations of
meaning on a particular subject, and determine their ‘typiﬁcation’ and
theorisation approaches (Hossain, Moon, Kim, & Choe, 2011). As the
values and believes varies, the chance of getting common solutions out
of the ‘typiﬁcation’ and theorisation decrease (DiMaggio, 1988). Hence,
signiﬁcation is critical to ensure the uniformity of the desired actions,
as response or solutions in achieving an institutionalised stage of the
DEST.
The focus group participants in this research agreed that change is
common. Nevertheless, referring to the initial roll-out plan and
numbers of beneﬁts as well as legislatives that need to be created –
the majority of focus group participants thought that UC is highly
ambitious and ‘gigantic’, which despite of it's plausible beneﬁts – the
‘implementation hiccups had made it ugly and unachievable. In fact,
this was the only reason that underpins their scepticism towards UC. In
one interview, the Programme Director mentioned “I think the people
who know the welfare system in detail would have been sceptical with the UC
ambition, and that's a sensible reaction”. It was evident that the
signiﬁcation process is incongruent and seriously lacking throughout
the UC implementation, although eﬀort had existed in the early stage of
UC introduction. Responding to an interview question, a local govern-
ment staﬀ said, “people don’t like the idea coming from the outside and
were suspicious of Duncan Smith, because they assumed he's wiping away all
the beneﬁts with UC – since the welfare budget has already been
constrained”.
The UC white paper was an example of a visible and eﬀective
communication tool that was used to convince stakeholders on the idea
of urgency in the UC implementation. As highlighted by independent
bodies, the failure to produce a UC blueprint was a major communica-
tion disaster that had impacted the project throughout. Its absence had
created divergence of solutions among the institutional actors, leading
to multitude of anonymous actions that sometimes went against the
transformation objectives (e.g. overlooked coding for automated fraud
prevention in the new system). Should there been a blueprint, majority
of the actors would have had clear understanding on the project
directions, had their actions systematically framed and consequently
reduced the variances in institutionalisation approaches.
Our focus group participants highlighted that the eﬀort to make the
staﬀ and people understand on the concept of UC was scarce, thus the
ﬁeld was ﬁlled with misconceptions and confusion. “Things became
worse when they perceived that UC is only a political tool” – said the senior
staﬀ in the interview. Another obstacle was unwillingness of the top
leaders to advise or inform the Works Secretary of the truth about
DWP's capability and readiness to implement UC when they were ﬁrst
approached about proceeding with such a huge DEST undertaking. This
was quoted during several interviews, and one of the recurring theme
was “the Permanent Secretary at that time was accepting the proposal
without consulting her team – weather the time frame is realistically
achievable, or whether we have enough capacity to proceed…”.
Meanwhile, another interviewee said “…she (the Permanent Secretary)
should have involved the delivery people as well, not just the senior leaders
before making any commitment to the Work Secretary.” These statements
indicated that the senior oﬃcer in DWP did not really understand the
process of implementing transformation.
The insuﬃcient preliminary signiﬁcation works such as ‘proof of
concept’ and dialogue with the minister had brought critical impact
towards the UC (i.e. derailments of timeline and writing-oﬀ the IT
infrastructure). Should the eﬀort be suﬃciently secured, potential
solutions can be identiﬁed at the early stage of the UC implementation.
Meanwhile, its repetition by the GDS team not only delayed the project
implementation, as the coding had to be re-developed, but wasted
public resources, particularly the money that was spent on the existing
system, and manpower (i.e. the GDS team that was lent to the DWP).
The absence of engagement with the claimants had also impeded
the signiﬁcation process. Thus, multitude of reactions that exists among
the claimants had caused barriers to adoption. Although the change is
mandatory, such engagement is particularly important in helping the
DWP to better design the new system, and elucidating the unforeseen
situations (e.g. potential policy decisions). On the other hand, the
‘green-shifting’ culture among the DWP oﬃcials had deterred corrective
actions needed to ensure the success of UC. It happens when the
misinformation created an unrealistic or untrue idea towards a
circumstance, and igniting mismatch in feedback or actions through
inappropriate scripts, which in turn shaped an undesired structure. This
idea of green-shifting was also endorsed by our focus groups, where
‘unwillingness to disclose actual facts’, or misjudged problem severity
were blamed as root cause.
One of the interviewees, who was part of the UC team, quoted “I
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think government is not good at thinking through future business models. In
the private sector, if you went through the scenario of how do we redesign
this business and what might it look like if it was more self-service and
online, you’d do some thinking, you’d draw a picture of how it will look like
in three years’ time, for instance.” The interviewee hypothesised that the
very reason why governments are not good at drawing a business case
for projects is due to the policy and politically driven environment. It
was highlighted that one of the real challenges in government remains
how you marry these two things together.
4.1.2. Domination: empowering actions through allocative and authoritative
resources
Structuration theory suggests that besides understanding the idea,
actions are also enabled by the amount of power that an actor has
(Giddens, 1984, p. 258). The central tenet in this aspect is under-
standing how the power was generated. Giddens (1984) argued that
power is an expendable property of the social system, which is
developed through the reproduction of domination structures. In this
respect, the two institutional resources that Giddens claimed as
constituting the domination structures are termed as allocative and
authoritative resources (Luna-Reyes and Gil-Garcia, 2013). The ﬁrst
represent the ‘material’ elements, while the later merely infrastructural
– i.e. emerged through space and time. These two resources co-exist,
where authoritative resources needed allocative resources to intensify
its dominance, while the allocative resources need to be augmented by
the authoritative resources to exist over time-space relation.
In the case of UC, the Works Secretary (IDS) had imposed his
authoritative resources in ensuring that the programme's implementa-
tion, despite of receiving lists of critics from the reviewing bodies,
colleagues, as well as the public. He also empowered the programme
kick-oﬀ, without waiting for the legislative approvals. Although such
eﬀort demonstrated personal belief on the beneﬁts of UC and commit-
ment, it led to multiple complications. Meanwhile, it was evident that
the allocated resources were equally important to facilitate actions in
UC implementation. For example, the conditioning of budget by the
Cabinet Oﬃce had impeded the procurement of the needed IT infra-
structures to replace the incompatible, existing infrastructure. Another
example was – the support given by the GDS team (perceived as another
allocative resource) had enabled the ‘corrective’ actions in terms of the
system coding, which was pivotal in shaping the UC system that is
available today. One interviewee stated: “UC is a fundamental redesign of
the beneﬁt system for working age people, yeah, so it's hugely complex… I
think the second thing would be that you know some of the management of
the IT delivery wasn’t strong enough… so, my predecessor, one of the things
he did was, he changed the management of it…. the management wasn’t
strong enough to do it.”
Meanwhile, when discussing about the creation of power through
resource allocation, one focus group member claimed, “there are about
400k civil servants and about 10k working on digital across the service. That
includes the contractors and so on. I’m not saying that a quarter should be
digital people, but 10k out of 400k is a very small percentage (2.5%). So
ﬁrstly, there are not enough people working on digital. And if you take the
question – do business owners understand digital – there's a big gap there as
well.”
The co-existence of the two was particularly depicted by PWC's
review of UC – that even in the absence of payment due to blocked
budget, the suppliers still executed their tasks handsomely. Other
examples of where authoritative resources were exercised were the
restructuring of DWP (by the Permanent Secretary), the commissioning
of the PWC for review, and the omitted budget cut by the Chancellor in
2016 – enabling the UC to resume its implementation. One focus group
participant reﬂected, “yeah, limited resources, well yeah its more of a
money challenges as well, but we’re in the early days of can we build our
own digital capability?
4.1.3. Legitimation: normalising the right and expected obligations
The normative component of social interactions is situated between
the right and expected obligations of the institutional actors that are
interacting in a certain context. Such component laid the claim of
legitimate practice i.e. accepted by a certain social system, known as
norm – and norm is shaped through code of practices or regulations
enforcements over distant time and space (Giddens, 1984, p. 165). In
this respect, a process to institutionalise UC appeared to be highly
challenging, partly because it is replacing the deeply rooted norms of
the existing beneﬁt systems which had been in place for decades.
Hence, it was opposed by many, especially the beneﬁt claimants who
are already complacent with the existing system. As detailed in the case
description, prior to the endorsement of the White Paper, DEST was not
welcomed by most MPs and the then Work Secretary for the DWP. In
addition, it did not have the needed support from the Treasury until the
review on the pathﬁnder had proven UC's economic impact.
Despite of such negative responses, DWP insisted on proceeding
with the implementation, and successfully managed to get the primary
and secondary legislations passed in 2012. Such legislations will be
used to facilitate the ‘normalisation’ of UC as a beneﬁt system replacing
the old one, which would take some time to be accepted as a new norm.
Nevertheless, the recent Brexit decision had created a new challenge –
where there is a need for certain primary legislations to be revised, thus
implying the need for the secondary legislation to be inherently
modiﬁed to accommodate the changes. This consequently will impact
the normalisation process – where a new set of right and expected
obligations need to be drawn to facilitate the UC implementation
process.
4.2. Lessons learned for the institutionalisation debate
The UK central government, through the DWP had prescribed UC as
a new welfare reform system to be adopted and implemented across the
country, gradually from 2017 to 2019. Variety of new structures
emerged as the outcome of the UC implementation, particularly the
new legislatives, organisational structures, empowerment of the local
councils, and change in the claim process, structures, as well as
payment mode. These structures entail many expected as well as
unexpected outcomes. Therefore, transparency is critical – i.e. sharing
of the UC concepts and ideas between all the relevant internal and
external stakeholders to increase take-up (i.e. adoptions) levels, and
subsequently facilitate the institutionalisation process. As identiﬁed in
several reviews – communication is a critical issue that emerged,
impeding the UC implementation. As such, to enable unanimous
actions, the responsible actors need to ensure that the concepts were
rigorously communicated to all relevant stakeholders. Transparency in
communication also governs the “transparency” of information, which
is crucial to enable assistance. For instance, the hiding of information
from PAC not only endangered the UC implementation timeline, but
also wasted public resources.
Besides communication issues, UC implementation was also hin-
dered by the resources restrained – both authoritative and allocative.
The constraint on authoritative resources was experienced when the
DWP often lost its momentum due to departure of senior oﬃcials that
were supposed to spearhead the UC implementation. In a diﬀerent
scenario, the absence of IT competency among the DWP team had
caused the development of wrong code, which had resulted into the
timeline derailments and waste of money. Meanwhile, the limited
allocative resource had no doubt failed the interventions process.
The interplays between structures and actors had created expected
and unexpected outcomes, in terms of communication, power and
sanction. To the decision makers, the expected results had helped
message delivery, system design, and collaborative networks of im-
plementing organisations. Nevertheless, the implementers perceived
the desired outcome had enhanced system features, which encompassed
additional requirements based on real life scenario, thus reﬂecting their
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understanding towards the practical aspects of UC. Despite expected
outcomes, the interplays had also produced unexpected outcomes; a list
of potential policy scenarios was obtained during the pathﬁnder
programme, encapsulating beneﬁcial information on UC, capturing
experiences and lessons throughout the pathﬁnder programme.
Therefore, signiﬁcation and domination process are critical in the early
stage of DEST implementation process.
4.3. Practical insights
In the pursuit of successful institutionalisation of digitally-enabled
service transformation in public sector, decision makers and imple-
menters should be aware that the programme involves the interaction
of multiple structures. In the case of Universal Credit, beneﬁt reforms
also include transforming other structures, practices and behaviours in
related organisations/institutions. An analysis should be conducted to
obtain some insights of structure requirement, expected actions, as well
as possible ‘actors’ around the project and structures that need
modiﬁcation or reinforcement. Clearly, institutionalisation is a struc-
turation process. Without the recursive interplays happening between
the actors and structure, a desired structure and practice supporting
DEST implementation would not be materialised, thus the institutiona-
lisation process will fail. Therefore, some practical recommendations
were drawn from formal and informal structuration process as lessons
to be learned by the practitioners, in facilitating the institutionalisation
process. Among others, these lessons can facilitate the decision makers
in project governance (i.e. role of decision makers, role of implementer,
roles of users), to achieve an institutionalised stage through three main
actions: communication, power and sanction. From communication
perspective, the main actor should be able to deﬁne methods and
information through their practices, involving other actors in the ﬁelds
in collaborative and participative eﬀorts. Messages should be clearly
deﬁned and delivered. Nevertheless, knowledge sharing should be
encouraged and supported to allow ‘same-page’ understanding among
all actors. From ‘power’ perspective, proper and clear distribution of
authority and responsibility over organisational resources among the
actors, are vital to create programme ownership. By having the own-
ership, actors will be accountable towards their action, thus facilitate
the shaping of ‘right structure’. Finally, from the perspective of sanction
– objective and scope of the project must be clearly identiﬁed and
deﬁned in the programme context, to help evaluation on the emerging
structures or actions, thus facilitate required intervention.
5. Conclusions
Digitally-enabled service transformations in government attempts to
improve service delivery in public organisations. Nevertheless, in
reality, the complex structure of government institutions, and co-
evolution of interactions between the actors of diﬀerent organisations
and integration of resources are the reasons underpinning the inability
of the public organisation to evolve with the pace of social and
technology change in the virtue of Digital Darwinism. This complex
situation can be better understood, as suggested in this study, by using
institutional and structuration theory concepts as an analytical lens.
The ﬁndings suggest evidence on structuration process across
various stages of UC implementation, where actors and structures are
inherently related in series of interplays that happened through time
and space. The ﬁndings are important to complement the existing
studies that were largely focused on technological imperatives and
strategic choices view of DEST. This study suggests how institutional
structures were raised and/or maintained and how such structures in
return, shapes actions – providing deeper insights of the institutiona-
lisation process. Hence, it can be concluded that the capacity of the
decision makers and implementers to thoroughly understand the
programme, as well as to reap the beneﬁt of the implemented new
practices is the main ingredient for a successful DEST institutionalisa-
tion.
There are some methodological limitations in this study. Coding
data in the context of duality of structure was diﬃcult, as we had to
determine what constituted an actor (human agent) and what con-
stituted structure in the research context. Therefore, for the purpose of
this study, the practices were identiﬁed as social structures prescribed
by the decision makers and actions instantiated by the implementers.
Another challenge is to code the structural modes and dimensions,
where it has to be mapped to Giddens's structuration framework. While
Giddens's model was used to code the structural modes and dimensions,
“A Sequential Model of Institutionalisation” (Barley & Tolbert, 1997)
was used to explain how the structure determines action that in returns
shapes structure, against time background. In this context, we were able
become the main research instrument for the structuration concepts
that entice limitation and risks. Hence, future research may redeﬁne
and retest the IT and ST concepts grounded in this study, using a
diﬀerent approach.
References
Baptista (John), J., Newell, S., & Currie, W. (2010). Paradoxical eﬀects of
institutionalisation on the strategic awareness of technology in organisations. The
Journal of Strategic Information Systems, 19(3), 171–183. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.
jsis.2010.07.001.
Barley, S. R., & Tolbert, P. S. (1997). Institutionalization and structuration: Studying the links
between action and institution institutionalization and structuration: Studying the links
between action.
Beneﬁts reform: ‘biggest shake-up for 60 years’ (2011). Channel 4 News. Retrieved from
https://www.channel4.com/news/beneﬁts-reform-biggest-shake-up-for-60-years.
Centre For Justice (2017). Centre For Justice. Centreforjustice.org. Retrieved from http://
www.centreforjustice.org.
Collis, J., & Hussey, R. (2013). Business research: A practical guide for undergraduate and
postgraduate students. Palgrave macmillan.
Conservative Party (2010). Fixing our broken society. London.
Department for Work and Pension (2010). Welfare reform white paper: Universal credit to
make work pay: Radical welfare reforms bring an end to complex system. https://
doi.org/ISBN 978-0-10-179572-2, Cm 7957.
Department for Work and Pension (2015). Policy paper 2010 to 2015 government policy:
Welfare reform.
DiMaggio, P. (1988). Interest and agency in institutional theory. In L. G. Zucker (Ed.),
Institutional patterns and organizations: Culture and environment (pp. 3–21). Ballinger
Publishing Co/Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. https://doi.org/103368769.
Dismantled National Programme for IT in NHS: report published – News from Parliament.
(2017). UK Parliament. Retrieved 1 March 2017, from http://www.parliament.uk/
business/committees/committees-a-z/commons-select/public-accounts-committee/
news/npﬁt-report/.
Giddens, A. (1979). Central problems in social theory: Action, structure, and contradiction in
social analysis, Vol. 241. Univ of California Press.
Giddens, A. (1984). The constitution of society. 1984. Polity. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/
2802469.
Impact Report 2015 | Deloitte UK. (2017). Deloitte United Kingdom. Retrieved 12 March
2017, from https://www2.deloitte.com/uk/en/pages/about-deloitte-uk/articles/
impact-report.html.
Luna-Reyes, L. F., & Gil-Garcia, J. R. (2013). Understanding the co-evolution of
institutions, technology, and organizations: the enactment of the state government
portal of Puebla. Proceedings of the 14th Annual International Conference on Digital
Government Research, 214–223 ACM.
Janowski, T. (2015). Digital government evolution: From transformation to
contextualization. Government Information Quarterly, 32(3), 221–236. http://dx.doi.
org/10.1016/j.giq.2015.07.001.
Goulden, C. (2015).What future for universal credit? JRF. Retrieved from https://www.jrf.
org.uk/blog/what-future-universal-credit.
Hossain, M. D., Moon, J., Kim, J. K., & Choe, Y. C. (2011). Impacts of organizational
assimilation of e-government systems on business value creation: A structuration
theory approach. Electronic Commerce Research and Applications, 10(5), 576–594.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.elerap.2010.12.003.
Majchrzak, A., Markus, M. L., & Wareham, J. (2016). Designing for digital transformation:
Lessons for information systems research from the study of ICT and societal
challenges. MIS Q, 40(2), 267–277.
Major Projects Authority Annual Report 2013–2014. (2014).
National Audit Oﬃice. (2016). House of Commons - Universal Credit: progress update.
London: Parliament UK. Retrieved from https://www.publications.parliament.uk/
pa/cm201516/cmselect/cmpubacc/601/601.pdf.
National Audit Oﬃce, N. (2014). Universal credit.
Nick Olson, S., & Khalid Yahia, S. (2006). Structuration theory: Giddens explored
structuration theory: Giddens Explored, 2006, 1–15 Retrieved from http://socgeo.
ruhosting.nl/html/ﬁles/geoapp/Werkstukken/Giddens.pdfhttp://socgeo.ruhosting.
nl/html/ﬁles/geoapp/Werkstukken/Giddens.pdf.
Oates, B. J. (2006). New frontiers for information systems research: computer art as an
information system. European Journal of Information Systems, 15(6), 617–626.
A. Omar et al. International Journal of Information Management 37 (2017) 350–356
355
Omar, A., & Elhaddadeh, R. (2016). Structuring institutionalization of digitally-enabled
service transformation in public sector: Does actor or structure matters? .
Omar, A., El-Haddadeh, R., & Weerakkody, V. (2016). Exploring digitally enabled service
transformation in the public sector: Would institutional and structuration theory
concepts keep the research talking? International Journal of Electronic Government
Research (IJEGR), 12(4), 1–14.
Omar, A., & Osmani, M. (2015). Digitally enabled service transformations in public
sector: A review of institutionalisation and structuration theories. International
Journal of Electronic Government Research (IJEGR), 11(3), 76–94.
Rao, H., Monin, P., & Durand, R. (2003). Institutional change in Toque Ville: Nouvelle
Cuisine as an identity movement in French Gastronomy 1. American Journal of
Sociology, 108(4), 795–843.
Scott, W. R. (2004). Institutional theory: Contributing to a theoretical research program.
In K. G. Smith, & M. A. Hitt (Vol. Eds.), Great minds in management: The process of
theory development. Vol. 37, (pp. 460–484). Oxford University Press. http://dx.doi.
org/10.1042/BJ20100043.Electrostatic.
Scott, W. R., & Meyer, J. W. (1994). Institutional environments and organizations: Structural
complexity and individualism. Sage.
Sivarajah, U., Irani, Z., & Weerakkody, V. (2015). Evaluating the use and impact of Web
2.0 technologies in local government. Government Information Quarterly, 32(4),
473–487.
Solis, B. (2016a). 5 tips for reimagining yourself in an era of digital Darwinism. Retrieved
from http://www.briansolis.com/tag/digital-darwinism/.
Solis, B. (2016b). 5 tips for reimagining yourself in an era of digital Darwinism. Briansolis.com.
Retrieved from http://www.briansolis.com/tag/digital-darwinism.
Thompson, M. (2012). People, practice, and technology: Restoring Giddens’ broader
philosophy to the study of information systems. Information and Organization, 22(3),
188–207. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.infoandorg.2012.04.001.
Timmins, N. (2016). Universal credit – From disaster to recovery? Retrieved from https://
www.instituteforgovernment.org.uk/sites/default/ﬁles/publications/5064 IFG -
Universal Credit Publication WEB AW.pdf.
Universal Credit introduced - GOV.UK. (2017). Gov.uk. Retrieved 10 March 2017, from
https://www.gov.uk/government/news/universal-credit-introduced.
Veenstra, A. F. V., Janssen, M., & Tan, Y. (2010). Towards an understanding of e-government
induced change–Drawing on organization and structuration theories. 1–12.
Veenstra, A. F. V., Melin, U., & Axelsson, K. (2014). Theoretical and practical implications
from the use of structuration theory in public sector information systems research.
The European Conference on Information Systems (ECIS) 2014.
Waller, P., & Weerakkody, V. (2016). Digital government: Overcoming the systemic failure of
transformation. Working paper 2.
Walsham, G. (2002). Cross-cultural software production and use: A structurational
analysis. MIS Quarterly, 359–380.
Whittington, R. (2010). Giddens, structuration theory and strategy as practice. Cambridge
handbook of strategy as practice, 109–126.
Yin, R. K. (1994). Case study research: design and methods. Applied social research methods
series, 5. Biography. London: Sage Publications.
A. Omar et al. International Journal of Information Management 37 (2017) 350–356
356
